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INTRODUCTION

Coaches play an important role in establishing a nondiscriminatory environment in public-school athletics, both on and off the field. In addition
to the duties associated with training a team for athletic competition,
coaches, like teachers, are hired to communicate with players and spectators
both verbally and demonstratively. Coaches are expected to not only teach
sports techniques, but also teach character, leadership, sportsmanship, and
other positive character traits. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District,1
courts from the district level to the Supreme Court have considered how
Coach Joe Kennedy's role as a coach factored into his right to pray on the
50-yard line directly following his team's high school football games.
This Article reviews Kennedy v. Bremerton School District,from its
inception through its current status, including the significance of Justice
Alito's concurring opinion issued in conjunction with the United States Supreme Court's denial of Coach Kennedy's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.2
After discussing the underlying facts, Part I provides an overview and analysis of the district and circuit courts' rulings focusing particularly on the
relationship between employee speech and the First Amendment religion
clauses. Part II discusses the implications of Justice Alito's concurring
opinion in denying Coach Kennedy's petition. And finally, Part InI discusses the future of religious speech jurisprudence for public school employees, now that Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh are on the Supreme
Court bench.
1. THE NINTH CIRCUIT: COACH KENNEDY AS A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNDER
THE ENG FACTORS

Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court's opinions in Kennedy
v. Bremerton are important to review to fully understand how this case, or
a similar case, may open the door for a significant change in speech and

1. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 634 (2019).
2. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in

denial of cert.). In his statement supporting the denial of Coach Kennedy's petition, Justice
Alito was joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. See id
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religion jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit's opinion, 3 outlined below, provides Justice Alito with a springboard for criticizing current caselaw on public employee religious speech generally. 4 Considering the two courts' decisions concurrently highlights how much the Supreme Court may shift its
position on religion and speech in the coming terms.
A. FactualBackground and the DistrictCourt's Decision
The Bremerton School District ("BSD") is a public-school district located in Kitsap County, Washington, just across the Puget Sound from Seattle. With over 5,000 students, BSD educates students from religiously
diverse backgrounds.5 Coach Kennedy joined the coaching staff for the
Bremerton High School ("BHS") football team as an assistant coach for the
varsity football team and as head coach for the junior varsity team in 2008.6
During his first season, Coach Kennedy began a practice of going to the 50yard line at the conclusion of each game, taking a knee, bowing his head,
and quietly praying a "prayer of thanksgiving for player safety and sportsmanship that last[ed] approximately 15-30 seconds."' 7 Coach Kennedy was
inspired to engage in this post-game prayer after watching the Christian
football film Facingthe Giants.8 Though Coach Kennedy began the postgame prayer ritual silently and independently, over time other coaches and
players began to join him. 9 By the 2009 season, Coach Kennedy started
giving short motivational speeches before his then-audible post-game prayers to a small crowd of coaches and players from BHS and sometimes players from the opposing team.10
3. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 813.
4. Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 635.
5. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 815. Students and families in BSD are reportedly members of
the following faiths: Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Bahd'i, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism. Id.
6. Id.
7. Joseph A. Kennedy, EEOC Intake Questionnaire, add. at question 5,
https://permacc/ZZV5-VWH4. Note that we rely heavily on Coach Kennedy's own EEOC
Complaint so as to present the facts most favorable to Coach Kennedy and thus avoid any
appearance of bias. For the purposes of this Article, we give deference to the facts as presented by Coach Kennedy and his legal team, in part because they have made their official
record of events available to the public; additionally, given the nature of this study, we want
to present facts and legal arguments in as neutral a manner as possible.
8. Lindsay McCane, Bremerton FootballCoach Joe Kennedy Defies Orders, Prayson
Field,INQUISITOR (Oct. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/BP5F-RGDJ.
9. Kennedy, supra note 7, at add., question 5.
10. Id.; see also Brett A. Geier & Ann E. Blankenship, Prayingfor Touchdowns: Contemporary Law and Legislationfor Prayerin Public School Athletics, 15 FIRST AMEND. L.
REv. 381, 415 (2017).
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At the beginning of the 2015 football season, a school district official
witnessed Coach Kennedy's post-game ritual from the stands. 1 In response, on September 17, 2015, the BSD Superintendent sent a letter to
BHS parents, faculty, and staff regarding prayer at athletic events.12 In the
letter, the Superintendent supported motivational talks "focusing on appropriate themes such as unity, teamwork, responsibility, safety, and endeavor," but noted that coaches and other district employees should not en13
gage in religious expression, including prayer, with or in front of students.
He went on to assure the community that students' right to free expression
of religious beliefs would be protected so long as it did not interfere with
the athletic event and was "entirely and genuinely student-initiated., 14 Citing school board policy, the Superintendent closed by reminding the community that "the District is bound by ... federal precedents."' 5
In response to the letter, Coach Kennedy stopped praying after games
for four weeks.' 6 His attorneys sent a letter to BSD officials dated October
14, 2015, informing them that Coach Kennedy would resume the post-game
prayers following the October 16, 2015 homecoming game. ' 7 BSD did not
respond to the letter, and Coach Kennedy made a highly-publicized return
16 in violation of the district policy
to his post-game prayers on October
8
and the September 17 directive.'
On October 23, 2015, the BSD Superintendent sent Coach Kennedy a
follow-up letter indicating that the District could provide Coach Kennedy
with accommodations allowing him to engage in post-game prayer, but that
any such religious expressions or activities could not be readily observable
by students and/or the public.' 9 After receiving this letter, Coach Kennedy
continued to lead post-game prayers following the October 23 varsity football game and the October 26 junior varsity football game, while on duty as
a district employee.2a On October 28, 2015, Coach Kennedy was placed on
paid administrative leave, and chose not to participate in the annual evaluation process at the conclusion of the 2015 season. 2' In his absence, Coach
11.

See Kennedy, supra note 7, at exhibit B.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at add., question 5.
Id. at exhibit C, page 6.
Id. at exhibit D.
Id. at exhibit D, page 3.
Id. at exhibit E.

21. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019). Coach Kennedy had previously participated in the review
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Kennedy's supervisors completed their evaluation, which included a recommendation that Coach Kennedy not be rehired because he "failed to follow district policy" and "failed to supervise student-athletes after games due
to his interaction with [the] media and [the] community. 22 The head coach
of the BHS varsity football team chose not to return for the 2016-17 season;
consequently, the District allowed the one-year contracts for all six of the
assistant coaches to expire and opened up all seven positions for new applicants.23 Coach Kennedy did not apply for a coaching position at BHS for
the 2016-17 school year.2 4
Represented by attorneys from the First Liberty Institute, Coach Kennedy filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), claiming that BSD violated his First Amendment right to
free exercise. 25 Before a resolution to the EEOC complaint was reached, on
August 9, 2016, Coach Kennedy filed suit against BSD "to vindicate his
constitutional and civil rights to act in accordance with his sincerely held
religious beliefs by offering a brief, private prayer of thanksgiving at the
conclusion of BHS football games. ' ,26 In the Complaint, he alleged that
BSD violated his rights to free speech and free exercise of religion, 7 stating,
[o]n its face, BSD's policy would prohibit all on-duty school employees, while in view of any student or member of the community, from
making the sign of the cross, praying towards Mecca, or wearing a
yarmulke, headscarf, or a cross. After all, each of those actions is
"demonstrative" religious expression and would be interpreted as
such.28
Coach Kennedy sought injunctive relief, requesting an order to require
"BSD to (1) cease discriminating against him in violation of the First
Amendment, (2) reinstate him as a BHS football coach, and (3) allow him

process and had generally received positive evaluations. Id. at 820. In this District, every
employee was evaluated annually, and they were invited to participate in that evaluation
process. See id.While employee participation was encouraged, employees ultimately decided if they wanted to participate. See id.

22. Id.(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Geier & Blankenship, supra note 10, at 417.

26. Id.at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Complaint at 3, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-cv-05694 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 9, 2016).

28. Id. Note that lower courts have upheld state statutes prohibiting teacher's religious
expression, including religious dress, while teaching. See generally United States v. Bd. of
Educ., 911 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1990); Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298 (Or.

1986).
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to kneel and pray on the fifty-yard line immediately after BHS football
games., 2 9 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington denied Coach Kennedy's request for a preliminary injunction
and concluded that he was unlikely to be successful in his First Amendment
retaliation claim based on an application of a five-prong framework laid out
in Eng v. Cooley.30 Specifically, the court concluded that Coach Kennedy
was speaking as a public employee, not a private individual, when he conducted his post-game prayers and that the District was justified in its atKennedy aptempts to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.3" Coach
32
pealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. The Ninth Circuit'sRationale
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's application of the fivepart framework for First Amendment retaliation cases set forth in Eng v.
Cooley de novo. 33 To succeed in his retaliation claim under the Eng framework,34 Coach Kennedy would have to show that "(1) he spoke on a matter
of public concern, (2) he spoke as a private citizen rather than a public employee, and (3) the relevant speech was a substantial or motivating factor in
the adverse employment action. ' '35 If Coach Kennedy could establish the
first three prongs, then the State would have to demonstrate that "(4) it had
an adequate justification for treating [Coach] Kennedy differently from
other members of the general public, or (5) it would36have taken the adverse
employment action even absent protected speech.,

29.
30.
31.
32.

Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 821.
Id. See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009).
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 822-25.
Notice of Appeal at 2, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-cv-05694 (W.D.

Wash. Oct. 3, 2016). In his request for a preliminary injunction, Coach Kennedy sought a
court order requiring BSD to "cease its discrimination against him on the basis of his brief,
private religious expression." Id.
33. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 821; see Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070-72 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court

of Appeals reviewed the District Court opinion for abuse of discretion. See Harris v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2004). "The district court necessarily abuses its
discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous
findings of fact." Id (internal quotation marks omitted). Since all parties appeared to have
agreed on the basic facts of the case, the Court of Appeals focused on the underlying issues
of law de novo. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 822.

34. In order to succeed, "all the factors are necessary, in the sense that failure to meet
any one of them is fatal to the plaintiffs case." Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1067
n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
35. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 822.

36. Id.
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The parties agreed on three of the five parts of the framework: that
Coach Kennedy spoke on a matter of public concern (Eng factor one), that
his speech was the motivating factor in its decision for the adverse employment action (placing Coach Kennedy on leave) (Eng factor three), and that
BSD would not have placed Coach Kennedy on leave had he not engaged
in the speech (Eng factor five).3 7 Therefore, the court only had to consider
the second and fourth Eng factors.38
1. Eng FactorTwo: Speaking as a Private Citizen or Public
Employee
In analyzing whether Coach Kennedy spoke as a private citizen or an
employee, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the holdings in Garcettiv Ceballos,3 9 Pickeringv. Board ofEducationof Township High School District
205,40 and Johnson v. Poway Unified School District.41 Public employees
exist in a tenuous place between public and private. In Garcetti,the Ninth
Circuit emphasized that "public employees do not surrender all their First
Amendment rights by reason of their employment,A 2 but rather they retain
individual rights "in certain circumstances[] to speak as a citizen addressing
matters of public concern."' 43 The Garcetti court went on to note, "when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.-44

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
40. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

41. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist, 658 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011).
42. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417. The Garcetti Court expanded upon the Court's ruling in

Pickering,in which the Court held that a school district violated a teacher's First Amendment
right to free speech when it fired the teacher for writing a letter to the editor of a local newspaper criticizing the school board's handling of a funding issue. Pickering,391 U.S. at 564-

65. The Pickering Court concluded that Pickering's letter constituted speech made by a
private citizen, not as an employee of the school district because it had not "impeded [his]
proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom" or "interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally." Id. at 572-73. The Court found that the school had no
greater interest in controlling Pickering's speech than it did controlling similar speech made
by any other citizen; therefore, the speech could not legally serve as the basis for Pickering's
termination. Id. at 574.
43. Garcetti,547 U.S. at 417.

44. Id. at 421.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2020

7

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:31

Whether a speaker acted as a public employee or a private citizen in a
First Amendment retaliation claim is a mixed question of law and fact.45 In
the
Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on two main issues:4 (1)
6
work.
speaker's
the
of
nature
the
(2)
and
job;
scope of the speaker's
A factual determination must first be made as to the scope and content
of a plaintiff speaker's job responsibilities. 47 The court may consider both
formal and informal evidence of the scope of the speaker's job responsibilities. 48 While formal job descriptions and where the speech took place may
be helpful, they are not dispositive in determining the legal nature of the
speech in question. 49 The Garcetti Court instructs that it is necessary to
look beyond formal job requirements and focus on the duties actually performed:
The proper inquiry is a practical one. Formal job descriptions often
bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected
to perform, and the listing of a given task in an employee's written
job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that
conducting the task is within the scope 50of the employee's professional
duties for First Amendment purposes.
In addition to the scope of the job duties, a court may also need to
consider the nature of the work itself In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed a retaliation case brought by a public-school teacher,

Bradley Johnson, who decorated his classroom with two large banners conveying religious messages. 5

The court determined that while the content

45. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008).
46. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2017), cert denied,
139 S. Ct. 634 (2019).
47. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 2008). Despite

Coach Kennedy's insistence, the circuit court held the trial court did not apply a "bright-line
temporal test" to the speech of on-the-job public employees. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 829. The
court determined Kennedy's status as a speaker for purposes of the Eng framework based on
the "totality of the circumstances." Id.
48. See Johnson, 658 F.3d at 966.
49. See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (noting "that
various easy heuristics are insufficient for determining whether an employee spoke pursuant
to his professional duties").
50. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-25. The second Eng factor "requires a practical, fact-specific inquiry, and [] courts may not rely solely on a generic job description."
Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 825 n.7.

51. Johnson, 658 F.3d at 965. Both banners measured approximately 2 feet by 7 feet.
Id. at 958. The first banner read "IN GOD WE TRUST," "ONE NATION UNDER GOD,"
"GOD BLESS AMERICA," and "GOD SHED HIS GRACE ON THEE." Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). The second banner read "All men are created equal, they are endowed
by their CREATOR." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The school had a long-
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of the speech was unarguably a matter of public concern, Johnson's speech
was still that of a public employee and not of a private citizen because of
the nature of his job as an educator.5 2 In examining the nature of the teaching profession, the court found that "[e]xpression is a teacher's stock in
trade, the commodity [he] sells to [his] employer in exchange for a salary. 5 3
Therefore, the Johnson court concluded that it was irrelevant that the content of the banners was outside of the bounds of Johnson's curriculum. 54 As
of the classroom and
a teacher, his professional speech could extend outside 55
outside of the "narrow topic of curricular instruction.
The Johnson court also considered whether speech at issue was made
possible by the nature of Johnson's position or if it could have been made
in the same manner by any non-employee citizen.56 The court concluded
that the answer was clear; Johnson's speech was only possible because he
was a teacher as "[a]n ordinary citizen could not have walked into Johnson's
classroom and decorated the walls as he or she saw fit, anymore than an
ordinary citizen could demand that students remain in their seats and listen
to whatever idiosyncratic perspective or sectarian viewpoints he or she
wished to share., 57 It further noted, "Johnson took advantage of his position
to press his particular views upon the impressionable and 'captive' minds
before him."'58 Applying the standard set forth in Pickering, 9 the Johnson
court held, "because of the position of trust and authority [teachers] hold
and the impressionable young minds with which they interact, teachers necessarily act as teachers ...when [1] at school or a school function, [2] in

standing policy allowing teachers to decorate their classrooms subject to specific limitations.
Id.at 967. The court determined that the particular religious speech did not fall "squarely

within the scope of his position" as a math teacher. Id. However, it went on to note that "as
a practical matter, we think it beyond possibility for fairminded [sic] dispute that the scope
and content of [Johnson's] job responsibilities did not include speaking to his class in his

(alternation in original) (emphasis omitted) (internal quoclassroom during class hours." Id.
tation marks omitted).
52. Id.at 967.

53. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Id. at 967 n.13.
55. Id.at 967-68. Because the banners were a form of communication to his students,
the court concluded that it was "beyond possibility for a fairminded [sic] dispute that the
scope and job content of [Johnson's] job responsibilities did not include speaking to his class
in his classroom during class hours." Id. at 967 (alternation in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 968.
58. Id.
59. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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the general presence of students, [or] [3] in a capacity one might reasonably
view as official." 60
In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit considered both the scope of Coach Kennedy's job and the nature of his work-applying these principles to Coach
Kennedy's 50-yard line prayer, the court concluded that he "spoke as a public employee, and not as a private citizen." 61 The court first noted that the
speech at issue was conducted directly after football games, on the 50-yard
line, in front of all of the students and parents. 62 When offered accommodations to either pray directly following the game in the privacy of the
locker room, or on the 50-yard line after the stadium was empty of students
and their parents, Coach Kennedy refused, implying that "it is essential that
his speech be delivered in the presence of students and spectators.'6 3 The
court also found significance in the fact that the 50-yard line prayer was
"directed at least in part to the students and surrounding spectators; it is not
solely speech directed to God.',64 Therefore, the court concluded that the
essential question in the case was "whether this demonstrative communication to students and spectators is itself ordinarily within the scope of [Coach
Kennedy's] duties. ''6S To answer this question, the court had to determine
the nature and scope of Coach Kennedy's job duties and the constitutional
significance of Coach Kennedy's speech given those job duties.
As a coach, Kennedy's job was "multi-faceted. '66 In addition to his
responsibilities supervising students on the field and in the locker room,
teaching the fundamental techniques of football, and caring for his players'
safety, Coach Kennedy also had a duty to serve as a role model for students. 67 His employment contract required that he endeavor to create strong
' 68
student-athletes, but perhaps more importantly, "good human beings.
Coach Kennedy was expected to communicate a positive message through
his speech and through his own conduct. 69 Through his actions and court
60.
61.
139 S.
62.

Johnson, 658 F.3d at 968.
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 825 (9th Cir. 2017), cert denied,
Ct. 634 (2019).
Id.

63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis omitted).
65. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 827.
67. Id. at 825. The court noted that Coach Kennedy engaged in all of these activities
"on school property, wearing BHS-logoed attire, while on duty as a supervisor, and in the
most prominent position on the field, where he knew it would be inevitable that students,
parents, fans, and occasionally the media, would observe his behavior." Id. at 827.
68. Id. at 825-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. at 826.
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filings, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Coach Kennedy
"understood that demonstrative communication fell within the compass of
his professional obligations. ' 70 As such, his role as a coach was "akin to
being a teacher.", 71 As a respected adult chosen to teach student athletes on
the field and in the locker room, he was "clothed with the mantle of one
who imparts knowledge and wisdom., 72 Like a teacher, expression was an
essential part of Coach Kennedy's "stock in trade., 73 As such, "[w]hen acting in an official capacity in the presence of students and spectators, [Coach]
Kennedy was also responsible for communicating the District's perspective
74
on appropriate behavior through the example set by his own conduct.
Given that expression fell within the scope of Coach Kennedy's job
duties and professional obligations, the court next turned to the constitutional significance of Coach Kennedy's 50-yard line prayer immediately after games, conducted within view of parents, students, and other spectators.7 5 The court concluded, "[Coach] Kennedy was sending a message
about what he values as a coach, what the District considers appropriate
76
behavior, and what students should believe, or how they ought to behave.,
The court determined that Coach Kennedy was intentional in his speech.77
All of the post-game prayers at issue in this case occurred at a school function, in the presence of students and their families, and in a capacity that
could only be perceived as official.7 8 In this case, Coach Kennedy had access to the field during and after the game "by virtue of his position as a

70. Id.
71. Id. See Grossman v. S. Shore Pub. Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1097, 1100 (7th Cir. 2007)

("Staff that interact with students play a role similar to teachers.").
72. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 826 (quoting Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d
517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994)). Coach Kennedy's influence over his students was evidenced by
the fact that "BHS players did not pray on their own in [Coach] Kennedy's absence." Id.
73. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 826 (quoting Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d
954, 967 (9th Cir. 2011)).
74. Id.at 827.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.Coach Kennedy indicated that the location and the timing of his speech were
essential elements of his claim. He insisted that he had to pray on the field on which the
game was played and that it had to be directly after the game concluded as part of his sincerely held religious belief. The court noted, "[tihese features confirm that the relevant conduct-[Coach] Kennedy's demonstrative speech to students and spectators-owes its existence to [Coach] Kennedy's position with the District." Id.at 827-28 n.8.
78. Id. at 827 (explaining that if the "speech 'owes its existence' to his position as a
teacher, then [the speaker] spoke as a public employee, not as a citizen, and our inquiry is at
an end." (quoting Johnson, 658 F.3d at 966)); see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968).
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coach."'79 Other groups who tried to access the field directly after the games
were denied access because the field was not an open forum.8" Furthermore,
Coach Kennedy's speech only carried "instructive force due to his position
as coach." 81 And the court noted that expression, both verbal and expressive, was part of Coach Kennedy's "stock in trade" as a coach.8 2 The court
determined that Coach Kennedy "took advantage of his position to press his
him.",8 3
particular views upon the impressionable and captive minds before
Thus, the court held that Coach Kennedy spoke as an employee of the
school district, not as a private citizen, and that his speech was not protected
under the First Amendment.84
2. Eng FactorFour:Adequate Justificationfor Differentiated
Treatment
Circuit Judge Milan Dale Smith Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in
which he extended the analysis of the Eng framework to consider the fourth
factor, looking at whether attempting to avoid violating the Establishment
Clause was an adequate justification for BHS's restriction on employee
speech.85 Under the fourth Eng factor, "the District can escape potential
79. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 827.
80. Id.Representatives of a Satanist group attempted to "conduct ceremonies on the
field after [a] [BHS] football game" but were denied access. Id.(alterations in original).
81. Id.at 827-28 n.8. "Surely, if an ordinary citizen walked onto the field and prayed
on the fifty-yard line, the speech would not communicate the same message because the
citizen would not be clothed with [Coach] Kennedy's authority." Id.
82. Id.at 826 (quoting Johnson, 658 F.3d at 967). The court dismissed Coach Kennedy's assertion that his speech was "private speech" because it did not relate to his job
and/or was not "coaching." Id.at 830. The court noted that
where, as here, a teacher speaks at a school event in the presence of students
in a capacity one might reasonably view as official, we have rejected the proposition that a teacher speaks as a citizen simply because the content of his
speech veers beyond the topic of curricular instruction, and instead relates to
religion.
Id.
83. Id.at 828 (quoting Johnson, 658 F.3d at 968).
84. Id.at 830. The court noted that "[b]ecause his demonstrative speech fell within the
scope of his typical job responsibilities, he spoke as a public employee, and the District was
permitted to order [Coach] Kennedy not to speak in the manner he did." Id.at 828; see
Johnson, 658 F.3d at 967-70; Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1213 (9th Cir.
1996) ("A teacher appears to speak for the state when he or she teaches; therefore, the department may permissibly restrict such religious advocacy."). Because Coach Kennedy's
speech was not protected speech under the First Amendment, the court majority found it
unnecessary to consider BHS's right to restrict speech to avoid violating the Establishment
Clause (Eng factor four). Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 822, 831.
85. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 831 (Smith, J., concurring).
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liability if it can show that it had adequate justification for treating Coach
86
Kennedy differently from other members of the general public.
Judge Smith concluded that BSD satisfied the fourth Eng factor; the
District had "justifiably restricted [Coach] Kennedy's speech to avoid violating the Establishment Clause." 87 Judge Smith noted that
[t]he record reflects ...that Coach Kennedy cared deeply about his
students, and that his conduct was well-intentioned and flowed from
his sincerely-held religious beliefs. Given those factors, it is worth
pausing to remember that the Establishment Clause is designed to advance andprotect
religious liberty, not to injure those who have reli88
gious faith.
However, despite his good intentions, Coach Kennedy's prayer constituted government speech that threatened students' freedom of belief and
worship. 89 Specifically, Judge Smith concluded, "an objective BHS student
familiar with the history and context of [Coach] Kennedy's conduct would
perceive his practice of kneeling and praying on the fifty-yard line immediately after games inview of students and spectators as District endorsement
of religion or encouragement of prayer." 90 Judge Smith concluded his concurring opinion by noting, "[t]hankfully, we no longer resolve these

86. Id. at 832. "[A] state interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation 'may
be characterized as compelling,' and therefore may justify content-based discrimination."
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)); see also Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d
517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The school district's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause
violation trumps [a teacher's] right to free speech.").
87. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 834. The parties disagree as to whether the District had to
show an actual Establishment Clause violation as in Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13,
or if it could rely merely on its legitimate interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation as in Lamb's Chapel v. Center.Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384,
394 (1993). Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 832 n.I. Judge Smith does not state which approach
would be correct under the law but does conclude that if Coach Kennedy resumed his postgame prayers, it would constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.; see Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (holding that based on the totality of the
circumstances, a court may find an Establishment Clause violation based on a district policy
that "involves both perceived and actual endorsement of religion").
88. Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 837.
89. Id. at 839.
90. Id.at 834. See also id ("If[Coach] Kennedy's practice were to resume, an objective
student would observe a public-school employee in BHS-logoed attire demonstratively praying in front of 'a large audience assembled as part of a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored
function conducted on school property."' (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist, 530 U.S. at
307)).
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conflicts with violence, but instead use courts of law, where parties make
arguments in free and open hearings to address their differences."'"
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE ALITO'S CONCURRENCE: OPENING A DOOR

FOR THE NEW JUSTICES
Coach Kennedy appealed the Ninth Circuit Court's decision to the Supreme Court of the United States. 92 On January 22, 2019, the Court denied
Coach Kennedy's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.93 While the petition was
denied, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh,
argued that the denial of certiorari "does not signify that the Court necessarily agrees with the [Ninth Circuit's] decision .... In this case, important
unresolved factual questions would make it very difficult if not impossible
at this stage to decide the free speech question that the petition asks us to
review." 94 Justice Alito's concurrence is a multi-page critique of the current
state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, particularly as it applies to religious speech of public employees. 95
Justice Alito first critiqued how the district and circuit courts handled
Coach Kennedy's case. He noted that "[w]hen the case was before the
[d]istrict [c]ourt, the court should have made a specific finding as to what
petitioner was likely to be able to show regarding the reason or reasons for
his loss of his employment., 96 If the district court had determined that
Coach Kennedy was likely fired for his neglect of duties, such as failing to
adequately supervise players, then his free speech claim would likely not
have been successful. 97 However, if the district court determined that Coach
Kennedy would likely have been able to prove that he was not on duty when
the prayer took place or that it took place during a time "when it would have
been permissible for him to engage briefly in other private conduct, say,
calling home or making a reservation for dinner[,]" then "[Coach

91. Id.at 839.
92. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634
(2019) (No. 18-12).
93. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019).
94. Id. at 635 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito notes that at this point in the case, to
be entitled to an injunction, Coach Kennedy would have to show "that he was likely to prevail on his claim that the termination of his employment violated his free speech rights, and
in order to answer that question it is necessary to ascertain what he was likely to be able to
prove regarding the basis for the school's action." Id.
95. See generally id.

96. Id.at 635.
97. 1d.
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Kennedy's] free speech claim would have [had] far greater weight.- 98 However, Justice Alito complained that neither the district court nor the Ninth
99
Circuit clearly identified what Coach Kennedy was likely able to prove.
Given the unresolved issues of fact involved in the case, the Supreme Court
could not grant discretionary review. 00 Justice Alito noted that while "petitioner's free speech claim may ultimately implicate important constitutional issues ...
[,] review of petitioner's free speech claim is not warranted
at this time."' 1 Justice Alito seems to be sending a very specific message:
he believed there were important issues that needed to be decided here and
that this case might well come back for further review in the future, once
the factual issues are resolved. 10 2 Justice Alito's concurrence reads like an
invitation for Coach Kennedy to appeal any final decisions in this case to
the Supreme Court if he is ultimately unsuccessful in the district and circuit
courts.

In Section II of the concurring opinion, Justice Alito took aim more
generally at the current state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, particularly as the Clause has been applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 103 Specifically, he took issue with the Ninth Circuit's application of
the Garcettiv. Ceballos'04 decision-calling it "highly tendentious .,10 5 Justice Alito characterized the Ninth Circuit's ruling as permitting the firing of
"public school teachers and coaches ...if they engage in any expression

that the school does not like while they are on duty" and that "teachers and
coaches... [are on] duty at all times from the moment they report for work
to the moment they depart, provided that they are within the eyesight of

98. Id. at 635-36.
99. Id. at 636. Justice Alito argued that the Ninth Circuit was particularly imprecise
regarding what Coach Kennedy would likely be able to prove. Id.He noted that the Ninth
Circuit focused more on Coach Kennedy's "prayer-related activities over the course of several years, including conduct in which he engaged as a private citizen, such as praying in the
stands as a fan after he was suspended from his duties." Id.
100. Id. Justice Alito argued that
if [the] case were before us as an appeal within our mandatory jurisdiction, our
clear obligation would be to vacate the decision below with instructions that
the case be remanded to the District Court for proper application of the test for
a preliminary injunction, including a finding on the question of the reason or
reasons for petitioner's loss of employment.
Id.

101. Id
102.
103.
104.
105.

See id
Seeid
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 636.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2020

15

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2

CAMPBELL LAW REViEW

[Vol. 42:31

students." 10 6 Under this interpretation of Garcetti, a teacher bowing his or
her head in prayer before lunch when visible to students would violate the
Establishment Clause.10 7 Justice Alito argued the Supreme Court did not
intend or promote this interpretation of Garcetti.'08 While Garcetti does
allow an employer to regulate employee speech associated with his or her
job duties, an employer may not create "excessively broad job descriptions"
in an effort to convert private speech to public speech.'0 9 Justice Alito
warned that if the Ninth Circuit continues to apply Garcetti in this manner
in future public school employee speech cases, employee 0speech at public
schools may be "appropriate" for Supreme Court review. "
In the same section, Justice Alito also took issue with how the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the Garcetti decision to the specific
facts in this case."' He noted, "[w]hat is perhaps most troubling ... is language that can be understood to mean that a coach's duty to serve as a good
role model requires the coach to refrain from any manifestation of religious
faith-even when the coach is plainly not on duty."' 1 2 Justice Alito took
particular issue with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Coach Kennedy's
media appearances and prayers in the bleachers while he was on suspension."13 He observed that the Ninth Circuit interpreted Coach Kennedy's
conduct as a signal of "his intent to send a message to students and parents
about appropriate behavior and what he values as a coach."' 14 Justice Alito
argued that "[t]he suggestion that even while off duty, a teacher or coach
cannot engage in any outward manifestation of religious faith is remarkable."' 15
While Justice Alito's perceived restriction on private speech might be
unacceptably burdensome on public school employees, he seems to have
overlooked some facts in the case or to have interpreted them in a light more
favorable to Coach Kennedy. Coach Kennedy's media appearances and
prayers in the bleachers might not be interpreted by others as disconnected
from his work for the District. While he was not being paid at the time of
106. Id.
107. See id. Justice Alito goes on to further speculate that "a school could also regulate
what teachers do during a period when they are not teaching by preventing them from reading
things that might be spotted by students or saying things that might be overheard." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424).
110. Id. at 636-37.
111. See id at 637.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 826 (9th Cir. 2017)).
115. Id.
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his media appearances, the facts seem to indicate that Coach Kennedy had
access to such a public platform as a direct result of his employment with
BSD and that a reasonable observer could still attribute his speech to the
District. 116 Certainly, these are facts that must be resolved by the trier-of117
fact.
In Section I1 of his concurring opinion, Justice Alito issued a reminder
that the petition under consideration was based only on Coach Kennedy's
free speech claims and that Coach Kennedy still had active claims under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.1 18 With an eye on the horizon for cases that allow the
Court to reconsider some key Free Exercise Clause rulings, Justice Alito
listed two opinions that might be ripe for reconsideration: Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith and Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.'19 In Trans World Airlines, Inc.,12 ° the
Court limited Title VII's requirement of employers' accommodation of religious practice to those that have only a de minimis burden. 121 Justice Alito
concludes by noting that, "[i]n this case... we have not been asked to revisit those decisions. 1 22 The way that this section is constructed, with these
two cases which have seemingly very little to do with Kennedy highlighted
in the last paragraph, seems to invite challenges to those particular cases.
Justice Alito's opinion leaves many doors open for those who wish to
challenge the Court's jurisprudence on religious expression and speech in
public schools, particularly by employees, and for direct challenges to the
Employment Division and Trans World Airlines cases. Any significant
change in any of these areas could have wide-spread implications for all
public employers. Preparing for what might be coming, considering the
new Court membership, is especially timely.

116. See Kennedy, 869 F.3d at 826.
117. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008)

(noting that "the determination whether the speech in question was spoken as a public employee or a private citizen presents a mixed question of fact and law."). The Posey court
goes on to note that "[flacts that can be 'found' by 'application of... ordinary principles of
logic and common experience... are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact"' and that "the
scope and content of a plaintiff's job responsibilities can and should be found by a trier of
fact through application of these principles." Id. (internal citations omitted).
118. Kennedy, 139 S.Ct. at 637.
119. Id. at 637 (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)).
120. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S. at 63.
121. Id. at 84.
122. Kennedy, 139 S.Ct. at 637.
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As Coach Kennedy's case demonstrates, the ability for an individual
to exercise his or her right of religious expression in public schools remains
a significant point of contention for both sides of the issue. Over the past
decade, the membership of the Court has continued to change, shifting
slightly left or right with each appointment. 123 However, with Justice Kavanaugh taking Justice Kennedy's seat, the pendulum may swing in a way
that has a noticeable impact.12 4 As Justice Alito implies in his concurring
opinion, there may be a greater willingness of the Court to reexamine and
modify the guidelines related to public prayer. Examining how Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh have addressed Establishment Clause cases in the
past provides insight into how they might rule if Kennedy, or a similar case
involving public school prayer, comes back up to the Supreme Court on
appeal.
III.

TAKE THE HELM: THE FUTURE
OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

JUSTICES GORSUCH AND KAVANAUGH

President Trump's nominations and subsequent confirmations of Justices Neil Gorsuch (April 2017) and Brett Kavanaugh (October 2018) set
the stage for potential reversals of caselaw dictating how public schools
have balanced the restrictions associated with the Establishment Clause
with rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. 125 As evidenced below,
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh's prior opinions illustrate their willingness
to consider prayer as part of the public-school experience. Justices Gorsuch
and Kavanaugh subscribe to the notion that in many instances the Court has
chilled individual religious rights in public schools by promoting avoidance
of violating the Establishment Clause to the detriment of the Free Exercise
Clause.
123. Scholars previously noted the composition of the Court can greatly affect religious
speech jurisprudence. For example, in a 2008 analysis of the Santa Fe Independent School
Districtv. Doe, 503 U.S. 290 (2000), Erwin Chemerinsky aptly noted that the affirmation of

the ban on prayer at public school events was strong, despite the changes in the composition
of the Court that preceded the Santa Fe ruling that shifted the collective political ideology

of the Court to the right. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Story of Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe: God and Footballin Texas, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 332-33 (Michael
A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds. 2008).
124. See, e.g., Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, JusticeKavanaugh, Lorenzo v. SEC,
and the Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 71

ADMIN.

L. REv. 193 (2019); see generally Elliott

Ash & Daniel L. Chen, What Kind of Judge is Brett Kavanaugh?, 2018 CARDOzO L. REV.
De Novo 70 (2018) (discussing the conservative nature of Justice Kavanaugh based on quantitative analysis).
125. Supreme Court Nominations (Present-1789), U.S.

SENATE,

https://perma.cc/58R5-

L7K9.
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A. The Ghost ofAntonin Scalia
The judicial philosophies of the late Justice Antonin Scalia have become standard conservative positions regarding prayer in public schools.
Without a majority of like-minded jurists, Justice Scalia's dicta on the Establishment Clause did not make up the majority of the court in his lifetime.
Noteworthy was Justice Scalia's view that the Founders of the nation were
prominent Christians who created a country that intended to embed religion,
specifically Christianity, into all private, and more importantly, public activities. 126 Furthermore, he argued that the Framers did not wish to establish
an impermeable wall separating church from state as Thomas Jefferson described and has become engrained in public prayer cases. 127 Secondly, Justice Scalia discarded the notion that the government must be neutral in its
capacity to permit religion in the public square.12 8 Lastly, was Justice
Scalia's open vitriol toward the Lemon test, 129 which controlled Establishment Clause cases for a lengthy period until it began to wane in the 1980s.
Justice Scalia was generally "unsympathetic to claims that government action had unlawfully aided religion."' 3a In fact, in his three decades on the
Court, "[he] never wrote or joined an opinion that found a government authority had violated the Establishment Clause.' 131 Justice Scalia was an active participant in religious freedom cases, with his most notable dissenting
opinions critiquing majority opinions that used the Establishment Clause to
invalidate legislative accommodations of religion and public expressions of
13 2
faith.
Justice Scalia provided a clear insight into many of his judicial philosophies in his dissents on Establishment Clause violation cases. The cases
most prominent to defining his Establishment Clause jurisprudence are Lee
v. Weisman (1992), Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School

126. See Thomas B. Colby, A ConstitutionalHierarchyof Religions? Justice Scalia, the
Ten Commandments, and the Future of the EstablishmentClause, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097,

1111-14 (2006).
127. See generally id; see also Jay Schlosser, The Establishment Clause and Justice
Scalia: What the Future Holds for Church and State, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 380, 385-92
(1988).
128. See Colby, supra note 126 at 1122-23.
129. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding government actions or
practices violate the Establishment Clause if they: (1) have a sectarian purpose, and (2) advance or impede religion, or create excessive government entanglement with religion).
130. REGNERY PUB., SCALIA'S
277 (Kevin A. Ring, ed., 2016).
131. Id.

COURT: A LEGACY OF LANDMARK OPINIONS AND DISSENTS

132. Id. at 278.
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1 Within these
Clause
Establishment
addressing
dissents, Scalia created a legal calculus for
134
violations. His dissenting opinion in Lee v Weisman is no exception.
The dispute in Lee v. Weisman arose out of a challenge to a Rhode
Island public school system's practice of inviting members of the clergy to
offer prayers at middle and high school graduation ceremonies.' 35 A student
and her father sued the school district, alleging that the prayers amounted to
government required participation in religion.136 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court agreed that the district's practice violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.137 Notably, the Court did not use the Lemon
test in its analysis. 138 Instead, the Court focused on the issue of coercion
and the pressure that school sponsorship of prayer would put on a non-believing student. 139 The Court held that what might begin as an innocuous
and tolerant expression of religion may ultimately end up in a policy to inculcate and coerce students into participating in religious practice. 140 Prayer
exercises in elementary and secondary schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion due to the fact that school age children are impressionable
and, if adults in the school exhibit certain traits or characteristics, the students may feel14 that they should act or behave in the manner demonstrated

District (1993), and McCreary County v. ACLU (2005).

by the adults.

The majority in Lee held that on these facts, government involvement
with religious activity was pervasive to the point that a state-sponsored and
state-directed religious exercise was established in a public school district. 142 The Court noted that the school district's supervision and control

of a high school graduation ceremony placed subtle and indirect public and
peer pressure on attending students to stand as a group or maintain
133. McCreary County. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
134. Lee, 505 U.S. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. id.at 580 (majority opinion).
136. Id. at 581.
137. Id.at 598-99.
138. ld. at 587.
139. Id.at 587-88; see id.at 587 (The majority provided "[t]he principle that government
may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. The majority further stated "[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' (alteration in original) (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
140. Id.at 591-92.
141. See id at 595.
142. Id.at 587.
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respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. 43 The Court established that a reasonable dissenter of high school age could interpret that
standing signified his or her participation or approval of the group's exercise versus respect for the event.' 44 The Court was not persuaded by arguments that the prayers were of a de minimis character. 145 High school graduation is a quintessential event, and the Court determined that forcing
students to choose between participating
in prayer or skipping the gradua46
tion celebration was unacceptable. 1
In a fiery dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the potential harm of "coercion" that may be felt by nonbelievers is outweighed by the benefit of
having people of many different faiths be able to come together in the "unifying mechanism" of public prayer. 147 Scalia opined that "the Establishment Clause must be construed in light of the [g]overnment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an
accepted part of our political and cultural heritage."' 148 Justice Scalia confirmed that "[a] test for implementing the protections of the Establishment
Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause.' ' 149 Justice Scalia further
noted that the Court's holding in Lee "[laid] waste a tradition that is as old
as public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component
of an even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to
God at public celebrations generally."' 5 Justice Scalia forcefully contended that "prayer has been a prominent part of governmental ceremonies"
and should not be prohibited because it is classified as religious speech. 151
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Lamb's Chapel 52 provides further articulation of the conservative position regarding the Establishment Clause,
which argued more allowance of religious actions in public schools. The

143. Id. at 593.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 594. The dissent written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice White
and Justice Thomas, argued that the majority's opinion, "[t]hat a student who simply sits in
'respectful silence' during invocation and benediction (when all others are standing) has
somehow joined-or would somehow be perceived as having joined-in the prayers is nothing short of ludicrous." Id.at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. See id at 595-96 (majority opinion).
147. Id.at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 631 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id.(alteration in original) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
150. Id.at 632.
151. Id. at 633.
152. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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majority held that a church, Lamb's Chapel, did not violate the Establishment Clause by requesting to use a public school to show a religious-oriented movie. 5 3 By denying the church's request, the school violated the
Free Speech Clause because it rejected the request solely on religious viewpoint.154 Justice Scalia's concurred with the majority's holding, but did not
agree with the majority's reasoning that allowing a group to view a religious
movie in a public school building after school hours was constitutional on
the basis that it did not cause the community to "think that the District was
endorsing religion or any particular creed."' 155 The majority validated its
finding using the three-part Lemon test.1 56 While Justice Scalia was likely
pleased with the Court's finding that a religious group using a public school
after school hours did not violate the Establishment Clause, he took umbrage with the use of the Lemon test in cases like these and the general phiis constitutional because it would
losophy that the use of a school's facilities
5
1
religion.
of
endorsement
an
not signal
Justice Scalia, critiqued the Lemon test in his concurrence by opining
that
[1]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up
in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again,
frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches
Union Free School District. Its most recent burial, only last Term,
was, to be sure, not fully six feet under: Our decision in Lee v. Weisman conspicuously avoided using the supposed 'test,' but also declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, however, no
fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own
opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart (the
author of today's158opinion repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion in doing so.

Justice Scalia further highlighted his displeasure with what he termed
"the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering
shapes its intermittent use has produced."'' 59 Justice Scalia contended that
the Court had been incongruous in its analysis of the Establishment Clause
153. Id. at 395 (applying the three-part Lemon test).
154. Id. at 394.
155. Id. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgement) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 395 (majority opinion).
157. See REGNERY PUB., supra note 130, at 276-77.
158. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted).
159. Id. at 399.
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using the Lemon test,1 60 noting, "[w]hen we wish to strike down a practice
[the Lemon test] forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it
forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling
16
its three prongs 'no more than helpful signposts[.]'

1

Justice Scalia's concurrence shows that he was agitated by the sui generis of the Constitution, which provides preferential treatment for "religion
in general," as identified in the Free Exercise Clause, yet forbids endorsement of religion in general. 162 He proffered the notion that the Founders of
the nation who wrote the Constitution "believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good., 163 Justice Scalia cited multiple examples from the early days of America where religion, primarily Christian
prayer, was employed in public ceremonies.1 64 He noted specifically that
the Northwest Territory Ordinance in 1787 and the Confederate Congress
that constructed Article III provided that "[r]eligion, morality, and
knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happinessof man165
kind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.',
Noting the italicized portion of this statement, Justice Scalia argued that this
is one such example of the Founding Fathers demanding the inculcation of
66
religious philosophy to establish good government and ensure happiness.'
A third opinion that helps illustrate the late Justice Scalia's perspective
on Establishment Clause violations is his dissent in McCreary County v.
ACL U.167 In this case, two counties in Kentucky posted readily visible copies of the Ten Commandments in their courthouses. 168 After the ACLU
sued to remove the displays on the grounds they violated the Establishment
160. Id. ("I agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon
and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering
shapes its intermittent use has produced.").
161. Id. (citations omitted).

162. Id. at400.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 400-01; see McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886-87 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (noting the public ceremonies by prominent founding fathers that included
prayer were not idiosyncratic but reflected the beliefs of the period); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S 577, 633-35 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison and amplifying the use of prayer in public ceremonies such as presidential inaugurations and Thanksgiving celebrations). Contra Geier & Blankenship, supra
note 10, at 389-93 (contending that the notion that America was founded as a Judeo-Christian nation is erroneous and misapplied).
165. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 400 (emphasis in original) (citing N.W. ORD. art. I
(1787)).
166. Id.
167. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 885.
168. Id. at 850.
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Clause, the counties adopted resolutions calling for a more extensive exhibit
of the Ten Commandments, arguing that they were Kentucky's precedent
legal code. 169 The new displays included nine framed documents including
the Declaration of Independence, the lyrics to the Star Spangled Banner,
5and the Ten Commandments.17 0 Upholding the district court's ruling, a 171
Clause.
Establishment
the
violated
display
the
4 Supreme Court held that
172
Consistent with his philosophy, Justice Scalia dissented with this finding.
Justice Scalia began his dissent with a historical analysis of religion in
the United States, noting that public expressions of faith had a long history
in the United States and clearly would not have violated the Constitution in
the eyes of the Framers.17 3 Justice Scalia believed that just as prayer at
graduation does not elicit any legal controversy, a public display of the Ten
Commandments was innocuous as well.1 74 He promoted two bolder conclusions in his dissent for McCreary. First, Justice Scalia contended that
the Constitution does not require the government to be neutral on religious
issues, and reaffirmed his contention that neutrality is not rooted in the history of the United States, but is in error in the Court's precedents. 175 Secondly, Justice Scalia declared that the Constitution does not prohibit the
government from favoring some religious beliefs over others in the context
of public acknowledgements. 1 76 He noted that 97.7% of all believers, including Christians, Jews, and Muslims, are monotheistic and concluded that
public expressions of faith that favor this great majority of believers did not
offend the Constitution. 177
The judicial philosophy of Justice Scalia regarding Establishment
Clause violations has become the primary doctrine for many conservatives.
169. Id. After the ACLU sued, the counties adopted nearly identical resolutions that
called for a more extensive exhibit. The resolutions noted that the state legislature's acknowledgment of Christ as the "Prince of Ethics." Id. at 853. The displays around the Commandments were modified to include eight other small historical documents containing religious references as their sole common element. Id. at 853-54.
170. Id. at 853-56. After revising the displays again, the counties neglected to modify
the resolutions, leaving the Ten Commandments as part of the display. Id. at 856.
171. Id. at 881.
172. Id. at 885 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 886.
174. Id. at 908-09.
175. Id. at 886-93. Justice Scalia believed that the Court had gone too far in removing
religion from the public square and had sided too often with those who charged an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 893. This philosophy can be summed in the comment from
his dissent, "[i]f religion in the public forum had to be entirely nondenominational, there
could be no religion in the public forum at all." Id.
176. Id. at 893.
177. Id. at 894.
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The belief that religiosity has been wrongly nullified in public squares (most
notably public schools) since the official sponsorship of public-school
prayer was held unconstitutional in 1962178 is a ruling conservatives seek to
modify.' 79 Simply by the fact that Justice Scalia never found in favor of an
Establishment Clause violation, but upheld Free Exercise rights, demonstrates his yearning to bring tolerance to religion in public schools. 180 Justice Scalia developed a strong conservative philosophy supporting religious
speech in public schools by never finding that individuals or organizations
violated the Establishment Clause. Maintenance of this philosophy will be
demonstrated by examining the two most recent Justices nominated to the
United States Supreme Court: Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh.
B. Justice Neil Gorsuch

While Justice Gorsuch has not written specifically on prayer in public
schools, he is likely to subscribe to many of the tenets espoused by the late
Justice Antonin Scalia.1 8' Additionally, a review of his testimony in his
Senate confirmation hearings, and the opinions he penned as an appellate
court judge, provide evidence of how Justice Gorsuch might vote on future
Establishment Clause cases, particularly school prayer cases.
The conservative sentiment of permitting religious expression in public schools, as expressed by Senator John Comyn, is that the Supreme Court
has "lost its way. '82 In his Senate confirmation hearing, Neil Gorsuch was
asked to speak on the separation of church and state.' 83 His response was
less than revealing; in noting that the First Amendment bars laws respecting
an establishment of religion but also protects its free exercise, he stated:
It's a very difficult area doctrinally.... So you're guaranteed free
exercise of religion, and you're also guaranteed no establishment of
religion.... Those two commands are in tension because to the extent that we accommodate free expression, at some point, the accommodation can be so great that someone's going to stand up and say
178. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that school officials may not require
devotional religious exercises during the school day, as this practice unconstitutionally entangles the state in religious activities and establishes religion).
179. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, The Truth About School Prayer,WASH. POST (Dec. 24,
2011), https://perma.cc/G5A4-ETLW.
180. See REGNERY PUB, supra note 130, at 277.
181. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The New Court and Religion, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/HXV3-9KT2.
182. Rob Boston, Going with Gorsuch, AM. UNITED: CHURCH & ST. MAG. (May 2017),
https://perma.cc/JVK3-HTJU (internal quotation marks omitted) (prefacing a question to
nominee Neil Gorsuch in confirmation hearings by Senator John Cornyn).
183. Id.
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you've established or you've passed a law respecting an establishment of religion. It's a spectrum, and it's a tension.184
As a circuit court judge, now-Justice Gorsuch struggled with the separation of church and state because the Supreme Court itself is divided on
the issue. He recognized the fact that the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause are in tension, noting:
[T]o the extent that we accommodate free expression, at some point,
the accommodation can be so great that someone's going to stand up
and say you've established or you've passed a law respecting an establishment of religion. It's a spectrum, and it's a tension. And in so
mediate two competing important
many areas of law, judges have to 85
values that our society holds dear.'

However, Judge Gorsuch was never directly faced with a case that specifically addressed a public-school prayer issue while on the Tenth Circuit,
during a time when "[t]he so-called 'culture wars' [did] not seem to be abating, conventional religious observance and affiliation appear[ed] to be dethe value--of religious liberty seem[ed] inclining, and the nature--even
86
creasingly contested."'
While Judge Gorsuch did not directly rule on a public-school prayer
case, he did hear a number of cases that likely reveal his constitutional positioning on the issue. The following Tenth Circuit cases illustrate how now
Justice Gorsuch might balance individual religious rights with the rights of
the community at large in Supreme Court decisions.
1. Hobby Lobby Case
Most commonly known as the Hobby Lobby case, Justice Gorsuch sat
on the bench of the Tenth Circuit Court as this case made its way through
the courts.' 87 Mr. and Mrs. Green ran both Hobby Lobby (a craft store) and
Mardel (a Christian bookstore) stores nationwide. 88 The Greens argued
that the "2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [(ACA)] force[d]
them to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs."' 189 The Greens

184. Id.
185. ConfirmationHearingfor Neil Gorsuchfor US. Supreme Court; White House Press
Briefing, CNN (Mar. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/S49Q-R5EU.
186. Richard W. Garnett, Neil Gorsuch, the Supreme Court, and Religious Freedom,
RELIGION AND POL. (March 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/4ABR-2PK5.

187. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), affdsub
nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
188. ld.at 1120.
189. Id.
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established their business with "express religious principals in mind." 190
For example, the religious tenets of the Greens prescribed rest on Sunday;
thus, their businesses were closed on Sundays. 9 1 Also, Hobby Lobby "refuse[d] to engage in business activities that facilitate or promote alcohol
use."'1 92 The Greens also subscribed to the idea that life began at conception
1 93
and any act that caused the termination of a human embryo is immoral.
The Greens operated Hobby Lobby and Mardel through a management trust
also guided by religious principles (each Green family member was a trustee). 194
The ACA required employment-based group health plans covered by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to "provide certain
types of preventive health services."' 95 "One provision mandates coverage,
without cost-sharing by plan participants or beneficiaries, of 'preventive
care and screenings' for women 'as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration
[HRSA]."",196 The mandatory preventative health services included Food
97
and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved contraceptive methods.'
Twenty such contraceptive methods were approved by the FDA "ranging
from oral contraceptives to surgical sterilization."1' 98 The Greens believed
that life began at conception and objected to any FDA-approved contraception that prevented the implantation of a fertilized egg.1 99 Therefore, the
Greens were particularly opposed to Hobby Lobby health benefit plans covering "the four FDA-approved contraceptive methods that prevent uterine
implantation. 2 00
Several entities were fully or partially exempted from the contraceptive-coverage requirement under the ACA, including religious employers. 20 1 A religious employer is defined as an organization that meets the
following requirements:

190. Id. at 1122.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1125.
194. ld at 1122.
195. Id.
196. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012)).
197. Id.at 1123.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1124-25.
200. Id. at 1125 (noting the four contraceptive methods: Ella, Plan B, and the two IUDs).
201. Id. at 1124-25; see Coverage of Preventative Health Services, 45 C.F.R. §
147.130(a)(iv)(B)(1) (2012).
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(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization. (2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the
religious tenets of the organization. (3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization. (4)
The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.2 °2
The government proposed an accommodation for certain other nonprofit organizations, including religious institutions of higher education,
that maintained religious objections to contraceptive coverage yet would
not qualify as a religious employer under the aforementioned definition.2 °3
Many of these organizations were granted a temporary "safe harbor," exempting them from having to cover contraceptive services. 20 4 "[I]f a business [did] not make certain significant changes to its health plans after the
ACA's effective date, those plans [were] considered 'grandfathered' and
[were] exempt[ed] from the contraceptive-coverage requirement. ' 20 5 Businesses with fewer than fifty employees were also "not required to participate in employer-sponsored health plans.""2 6 As written, the ACA did not
include an exemption that extended to for-profit organizations. 0 7
While the Greens' businesses did not qualify for an exemption, they
objected to providing employees with health insurance coverage for contraceptive methods that prevent uterine implantation. 20 8 The deadline for compliance with the contraceptive-coverage requirement was July 1, 2013, after
which time failure to comply resulted in "immediate tax penalties, potential
regulatory action, and possible private lawsuits." 20 9 The Greens also faced

202. Id. at 1123; see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B)(1).

203. See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 8456, 8461 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
204. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d. at 1124.

205. Id.The government reasoned that the number of grandfathered health plans would
diminish over time, that many of the grandfathered plans actually covered contraceptives,
and that financial incentives would push small businesses into providing health plans that
complied with the contraceptive-coverage requirement. Id
206. Id.
207. Id.
at 1124-25. The Greens did not object to providing coverage for the other sixteen
208. Id.
contraceptive methods; they only objected to providing coverage for those methods that speat 1125.
cifically prevented the implantation of a fertilized egg into the uterine wall. Id.
209. Id.The contraceptive-coverage requirement mandated coverage to all twenty of the
FDA-approved contraceptive methods. See id.
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a more immediate penalty of regulatory taxes for each individual to whom
such failure related.2 1 °
The Greens filed suit on September 12, 2012, challenging the constitutionality of the contraceptive-coverage requirement as delineated by the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. 2 11
One of the first hurdles the plaintiffs had to clear was establishing their right
to bring a claim under the RFRA and demonstrating the likelihood of success on their RFRA claim to warrant a preliminary injunction. 2 12 The principle questions presented to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals were: "(1)
whether Hobby Lobby and Mardel [were] 'persons' exercising religion for
purposes of RFRA; (2) if so, whether the corporations' religious exercise
[was] substantially burdened; and (3) if there [was] a substantial burden,
whether the government [could] demonstrate a narrowly tailored compelling government interest." 21 3 The Tenth Circuit concluded that "the contraceptive-coverage requirement substantially burden[ed] Hobby Lobby and
Mardel's rights under RFRA" and that the government had not demon214
strated "a narrowly tailored compelling interest to justify [the] burden."
Judge Gorsuch joined in the majority opinion of the court, but wrote a
concurring opinion "to explain why the Greens..., as individuals,

210. Id. The regulatory tax of $100 per day for each of the 13,000 individuals insured by
Hobby Lobby would have totaled "at least $1.3 million per day, or almost $475 million per
year." Id. at 1125. If Hobby Lobby instead chose to "drop employee health insurance altogether," they would have faced "penalties of $26 million per year." Id.
211. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1125. Their motion for preliminary injunction

was repeatedly unsuccessful because several courts (or judges) concluded that the petitioners' entitlement to such relief was not clear. The request for injunctive relief was initially
denied by the district court, the Tenth Circuit, and the Supreme Court (Justice Sotomayor,
sitting alone) before coming back to the Tenth Circuit for a hearing by the full court. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S. 1401 (2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
No. 120-6294, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26741, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012); Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev'd, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th
Cir. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
212. Hobby Lobby Stores, lnc., 723 F.3d. at 1121. The plaintiffs had to establish a prima

facie case under RFRA by showing that enforcement would substantially burden a sincerely
held religious belief. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001). Once

the plaintiffs met that burden, the burden of proof shifted to the government to show that
"the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the
person'-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened." Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430-31 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)).
213. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1126.

214. Id.at 1128.
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[were] ... entitled to relief' under the Anti-Injunction Act.21 5 Judge Gorsuch's concurring opinion provides some insight as to how he approaches
religious rights under the law. Judge Gorsuch began his concurring opinion
by discussing the concept of complicity and the moral culpability associated
with conduct that conflicts with religious doctrine.2" 6 Specifically, he
wrote:
All of us face the problem of complicity. All of us must answer for
ourselves whether and to what degree we are willing to be involved
in the wrongdoing of others. For some, religion provides an essential
source of guidance both about what constitutes wrongful conduct and
the degree to which those who assist others in committing wrongful
conduct themselves bear moral culpability. The Green family members are among those who seek guidance from their faith on these
questions. Understanding that is the key to understanding this
case.

2 7

1

In this paragraph, Judge Gorsuch arguably implied that adherence to
one's religious faith might be more important to some than principles of
law. He focused on the sincerity of the Greens' religious beliefs and not the
contestability of their religious convictions.2 18 He noted that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act "does [not] just apply to protect popular religious
beliefs: it does perhaps its most important work in protecting unpopular re.,,219 To Gorsuch, jurisprudential philosophy was not "to
ligious beliefs.
question the correctness or the consistency of tenets of religious faith," but
rather "to protect the exercise of faith. '220 The Greens found themselves at
the nexus of the ACA and the RFRA-the former compelled them to act,
while the latter said they did not have to. 22' "Congress structured RFRA to
override other legal mandates, including its own statutes, if and when they
encroach[ed] on religious liberty., 222 Congress noted that "[w]hen construing any 'federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993,' ... [this
Court] should deem it 'subject to [RFRA] unless such law explicitly excludes such application.' 223 "In this way, RFRA is indeed something of a

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.
Id. at

1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

1152-53.
1153.
1156.
1157 (last alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b) (2012)).
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'
'super-statute. ,,224
"[B]ecause the government [did not identify any] ex-

plicit exclusion in the ACA.. ., it [was] RFRA's legislative direction that
225
must prevail in the end.
In order to predict Justice Gorsuch's future votes for cases dealing with
religion in public schools, analyzing Hobby Lobby is critical. As the introduction to this section on Justice Gorsuch noted, he has yet to crystallize his
judicial philosophy when analyzing the tension between the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. His position in Hobby Lobby demonstrates that he will most likely be sympathetic to religious claimants and
will side with making accommodations for religious action in the public
square.
2. American Atheists v. Davenport
American Atheists v. Davenport is another Tenth Circuit case that illustrates how Justice Gorsuch's prior decisions might influence his Establishment Clause interpretations on the Supreme Court. 226 "In 1998 the Utah
Highway Patrol Association [("UPHA")] ...began a project to memorialize [Utah Highway Patrol ("UHP")] troopers ...by placing large white
crosses near the locations of their deaths. '2 27 "The crosses [were] approximately twelve feet tall" and "[bore] the UHP's beehive symbol, the deceased trooper's picture, and a plaque containing the officer's biographical
information., 228 "The deceased officer's name and badge number [were]
painted on the six-foot crossbar in large, black lettering., 229 "The [s]tate of
Utah permitted the UHPA to erect approximately thirteen crosses on public
property, but explicitly stated that it 'neither approve[d] or disapprove[d]
230
the memorial marker[s]. ,,
The Tenth Circuit struck down the project under the Establishment
Clause by "[employing] Justice O'Connor's endorsement test.923 1 "Under
[Justice O'Connor's] framework, governmental action violates the Establishment Clause if, as viewed by a 'reasonable observer,' it has the 'effect
of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of

224. Id. (quoting Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom
and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. Ri~v. 249, 253 (1995)).

225. Id.
226. Am. Atheists v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir 2010).
227. Id. at 1102 (Kelly, J., dissenting).

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. (last alteration in original) (quoting Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145,
1151 (10th Cir. 2010)).

231. Id.
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religion.' ' 2 32 The concept of a "reasonable observer" in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence "is kin to the fictitious 'reasonably prudent person' of
tort law." 233 "[T]he reasonable observer 'is presumed to know far more than
Under the endorsemost actual members of a given community ... ,,,234
ment test, a court's ultimate task is not to determine "whether some people
may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable person might
think [the State] endorses religion., 235 Instead, a court must determine
whether a fully informed, intelligent, and judicious reasonable observer
a message that the govwould conclude that the display effectively sends
236
another.,
over
religion
one
"prefer[s]
ernment
Judge Gorsuch joined the dissent in which Judge Kelly concluded that
the court's application of the endorsement test [was] incorrect to the
(1) effectively imposed a presumption of unconstituextent [that] it:
tionality on religious symbols in the public sphere; (2) employed a
'reasonable observer' who ignored certain facts of the case and instead drew unsupported and quite odd conclusions; and (3) incorrectly
crosses themselves, instead of
focused on the religious nature of the
237
the messages [the crosses] convey.
The dissent noted that the Tenth Circuit correctly determined that the
Latin crosses denoted a symbol of the Christian faith. 238 However, Judge
Kelly complained that the majority opinion focused more on the religious
connotation of the crosses instead of the secular items on the crosses themselves, such as the officer's picture, "name and badge number," and a
"plaque containing biographical information., 239 Judge Kelly argued the
court had a duty to first "thoroughly analyze the appearance, context, and
factual background of the challenged displays" and then to decide the full
2 40
display's constitutionality.
232. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
233. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1158 (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017,
1031 (10th Cir. 2008)).
234. Id.at 1159 (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031 n. 16).

235. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d
1538, 1544 (6th Cir. 1992)).
236. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1029).
237. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1102.

238. Id.
239. Id.at 1102-03.
240. Id.at 1103; see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-600 (1989);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1984); Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
568 F.3d 784, 799-805 (10th Cir. 2009); Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017,

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol42/iss1/2

32

Geier and Blankenship-Knox: When Speech Is Your Stock in Trade: What Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch

2020]

WHEN SPEECH IS YOUR STOCK IN TRADE

In contrast to the immediate assumption of unconstitutionality, in
Lynch v. Donnelly241 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU,24 2 the Supreme
Court carefully considered all relevant factors to decide whether the displays conveyed a message of endorsement, rather than presuming unconstitutionality.243 In Allegheny, the Supreme Court rejected the view that religious symbols on public property are presumptively unconstitutional.2 44
Similarly, in Green v. Haskell County Board of Commissioners, the Supreme Court expressly rejected a presumption of unconstitutionality for displays of the Ten Commandments on public property.2 45
Adding neutrality to the debate about religious icons being displayed
in the public square, Judge Kelly postulated that while the state "cannot
erect or maintain symbols that convey 'a message of governmental endorsement of religion,"' the opposite is also true-the state "can erect or maintain
religious symbols that do not convey a message of endorsement., 246 Judge
Kelly contended that "the mere presence of the memorial crosses, which are
undoubtedly the 'preeminent symbol of Christianity' tells us next to nothing.,,247 Furthermore, "[w]ithout consulting all relevant factors, [the court
cannot] determine whether the challenged displays violate the Establishment Clause. ' 248 "To presume otherwise is to evince hostility towards religion, which the First Amendment unquestionably prohibits.,, 249 Therefore,

"at the outset of this case the [d]efendants were not required to 'secularize
the message' of the memorial crosses., 250 Instead, "like in any other case,
the [p]laintiff s bore the initial burden of proof-here, showing that, given

1033-37 (10th Cir. 2008); O'Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1227-31 (10th Cir.

2005). Judge Kelly noted that all of these "cases cited [involved] a display with at least some
religious content." Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1103.
241. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
242. County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 573.
243. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-600; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-80.
244. County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 614 ("The mere fact that Pittsburgh displays symbols of both Christmas and Chanukah does not end the constitutional inquiry.").
245. See Green, 568 F.3d at 799 (rejecting at the outset Mr. Green's argument that governmental displays of the text of the Ten Commandments are presumptively unconstitutional).
246. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1103 (quoting Am. Atheists, Inc.
v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010)); see, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668; Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1017 (10th Cir. 2008).
247. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1160) (citation omitted).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1160).
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the memorial crosses had the purpose or
all relevant context and history,
251
effect of endorsing religion.,

The dissenters next addressed the second issue with the majority's application of the endorsement test.252 Judge Kelly specifically analyzed the

concept of "reasonable observer," which is central to impugning the majority's proscription of placing memorial crosses on public roadsides.2 53 Several cases are noted, which demonstrate a "reasonable observer is keenly
aware of the details of [a] challenged display. '254 According to the dissenters, contrasting the facts of what a "reasonable observer" should infer with
the argument of the majority, the "reasonable observer" in American Atheists v. Duncan failed to account for "the officer's name and badge number
painted on the crossbar in large, black letters, the officer's picture, and the
biographical plaque." 255 "Ostensibly[,] this is because 'a motorist driving
by one of the memorial crosses at 55-plus miles per hour may not notice,
and certainly would not focus on, the biographical information.'- 2

56

Using

the majority's theory, the dissent states, "the court itself noted that the reasonable observer's knowledge is 'not limited to the information gleaned
simply from viewing the challenged display.' 257 Thus, Judge Kelly argues
knows "far
that there should be a presumption that the reasonable observer
58
more than most actual members of a given community."
The reasonable observer, in the majority opinion, did not "address the
obvious and critical facts surrounding the memorial crosses. 25 9 Judges
Kelly and Gorsuch concluded the following facts were persuasive in showing that the cross memorials did not primarily express religion: the location
of the cross was marking the spot of the officer's death, the cross was sponsored by a private organization, the selection of the cross by the officer's
family, and the disclaimer that the state of Utah did not endorse the memorials.2 60 The dissent noted that in other cases, a reasonable observer fully

251. Id. at 1103-04.
252. Id. at 1104.
253. Id.
254. Id.; see, e.g., Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 568 F.3d 784, 800-03 (10th
Cir. 2009); Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1033 n.18 (10th Cir. 2009);
O'Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1229 (10th Cir. 2005).
255. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1104.
256. Id.at 1104 (quoting Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1160 (10th Cir.
2010)).
257. id.(quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1158).
258. Id.(citing Duncan,616 F.3d at 1159).
259. Id. at 1105.
260. Id.
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considered relevant background information. 261 This additional information actually mitigates the effect of government endorsements.
In concert with the contention that the court disregarded the relevant
facts of the reasonable observer theory, the dissent also claimed the majority
incorrectly focused on the religious nature (namely, size) of the crosses, instead of the messages they convey.26 2 The argument was that the link between the UHP's beehive symbol and religiosity was impetus and erroneously deduced that the UHP was some form of "Christian police ... in
enforcing the law and hiring new employees." 263 The dissent argued memorials should conjure the conclusion that they memorialize fallen police
264
officers-not a government endorsement of a state-sponsored religion.
The memorial crosses were more than what they appeared and the reasonable observer should not construct an analysis upon unfounded fears of discrimination. 265 Freidman v. Board of County Commissioners is an amplified example of this ability to dissect a potential state endorsement of
religion.26 6 In Freidman, a county's seal was affixed to law enforcement
vehicles, which bore a cross surrounded by a blaze of golden light, a flock
267
of sheep, and a Spanish phrase that translated to "with this, we conquer.'
However, in American Atheists, the majority repeatedly emphasized the size
of the crosses, noting "that the twelve-foot memorials [were] considerably
[larger] than most roadside crosses. "26 8 The UHPA's explanation for the
size of the seal was to ensure that passing motorists would notice the display
and absorb the "message of 'death, honor, remembrance, gratitude, sacrifice
and safety. ,,269 The dissent concluded that it was unlikely that the reasonable observer test would be met if the crosses were smaller as the information contextualizing the memorial would be illegible. 270 Governments
would then be faced with a "Hobson's choice" of "foregoing memorial
crosses or facing litigation.

' 27 1

261. Id.; see, e.g., Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 568 F.3d 784, 800-01 (10th

Cir. 2009); Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1037; O'Connor v. Washburn
Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005).
262. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1105-06.
263. Id. at 1105 (quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1161).

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id.
Friedman v. Rd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985).
Id.at 779.
Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1105.
Id.at 1106 (quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151).
Id.
Id.
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Judge Gorsuch joined Judge Kelly's dissent, but sought to draw attention to two more issues in his own dissenting opinion. First, like Judge
Kelly, he claimed that the Tenth Circuit repeatedly misapplied Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test.272 To Judge Gorsuch, a reasonable observer

is not "'any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable
things, but.., a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior.' 273 According to Judge Gorsuch, the reasonable observer in American
Atheists was "biased, replete with foibles, and prone to mistake[s]. ' 274 Differing from Judge Kelly, Judge Gorsuch argued that the observer in this case
started with a "biased presumption that Utah's roadside crosses are unconstitutional. 2 75 This preconception was held despite the fact that a plurality
of the Supreme Court held in Salazar v. Buono that "'[a] cross by the side
of a public highway marking, for instance, the place where a state trooper
perished need not be taken as a statement of governmental support for sectarian beliefs.' 2 76 However, the observer in American Atheists took no
heed of the Supreme Court's direction and was assumed to disregard the
secularizing details, "such as the fallen trooper's name inscribed on the
crossbar" because the majority contended that a motorist driving by the memorial at more than 55 miles per hour would not notice the biographical
information.2 7 7 Judge Gorsuch acerbically responded to this notion by stating:
So it is that we must now apparently account for the speed at which
our observer likely travels and how much attention he tends to pay to
what he sees. We can't be sure he will even bother to stop and look
at a monument before having us declare the state policy permitting it
unconstitutional.
But that's not the end of things. It seems we must also take account
of our observer's selective and feeble eyesight. Selective because our
observer has no problem seeing the Utah highway patrol insignia and
using it to assume some nefarious state endorsement of religion is going on; yet, mysteriously, he claims the inability to see the fallen
trooper's name posted directly above the insignia.

272. Id.at 1107-11 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 1107-08 (quoting Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
274. Id.at 1108.

275. Id.
276. Id.(alternation in original) (quoting Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 718-19
(2010)).

277. Id.
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And feeble because our observer can't see the trooper's name even
though it is painted in approximately 8-inch lettering across a 6-foot
cross-bar-the same size text used for posting the words "SPEED
LIMIT' alongside major interstate highways ....All the same, our
observer plows by, some combination of too blind and too fast to read
signs adequate for interstate highway traffic. Biased, selective, vision
impaired, and a bit of a hot-rodder our observer may be, but 2the
rea78
sonable observer of Justice O'Connor's description he is not.
Secondly, Judge Gorsuch argued that "anything a... 'reasonable observer' could think 'endorses' religion" might raise constitutional infirmities.279 He strongly contended that the Utah state actors did not act with any
religious purpose, nor did the memorials coerce anyone to participate in any
religious exercise. 280 In actuality, most citizens of Utah did not revere the
cross; thus, the majority held Utah's policy violated the First Amendment
because the majority was "able to imagine a hypothetical 'reasonable observer' who could think Utah mean[t] to endorse religion-even when it [did
not]. 281 Instead, Judge Gorsuch claimed that the reasonable observer test
may not be the most appropriate lens by which Establishment Clause challenges should be analyzed.2 82 The majority in this case failed to consider
this perspective.2 83
3. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone
In 2010, the Tenth Circuit adjudicated Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, which
also provides for examination of Judge Gorsuch's judicial philosophy toward individual religious liberties. 284 Madyun Abdulhaseeb, an Islamic inmate in Oklahoma, brought suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and set forth seventeen claims concerning
the conditions of his incarceration. 285 The district court granted summary

278. Id. at 1108-09 (citations omitted).
279. Id. at 1110.
280. Id.

281. Id.
282. Id.; see Van Orden v.Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687 (2005); Card v.City of Everett, 520
F.3d 1009, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008); ACLU Neb.Found. v.City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772,
778 n.8 (8th Cir. 2005); Myers v.Loudoun Cty. Pub.Sch., 418 F.3d 395,402 (4th Cir. 2005).
283. See Davenport,637 F.3d at 1110.
284. Abdulhaseeb v.Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch,J.,
con-

curring).
285. Id.at 1306-09; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2012); Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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judgment on all but two claims because286Abdulhaseeb did not exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to the suit.
Abdulhaseeb first contended that his "religious exercise was substantially burdened when [Oklahoma State Penitentiary officials] denied his request for a halal diet ' 287 and his subsequent "request for halal meat for an
Islamic feast., 28 8 In addition, certain foods were placed on Abdulhaseeb's
tray that must be completely avoided according to Islamic law. 289 The two
claims that the district court did not dismiss were claim five, failing to provide halal meats for the Islamic feast of Eid-ul-Adha, and claim ten, denying
him a halal diet at Oklahoma State Penitentiary.2 9 °
The Tenth Circuit determined that Abdulhaseeb had shown a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether his religious exercise was substantially
291
Prison officials did not challenge the sincerity of Abburdened.
dulhaseeb's faith,29 2 so the only query before the court was whether there
was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the denial of a halal diet as a
substantial burden on Abdulhaseeb's beliefs.293 The Oklahoma Department
of Corrections ("ODOC") maintained a policy that food be brought in only
by approved vendors and the ODOC had not approved any vendors from
which Adulhaseeb could have purchased or obtained halal food.294 The
Tenth Circuit held Abdulhaseeb's rights could be violated for two reasons.295 First, Abdulhaseeb was indigent.29 6 Second, even if he was not
indigent, he could not be required to make a Hobson's choice between essentials-his religion or sustenance.297
The court held that "the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) prohibit[ed] the government from forcing a prisoner to

286. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1305-06.
287. Id. at 1306. On several occasions, Abdulhaseeb requested an Islamic diet in which
animals are raised, fed, and slaughtered according to Islamic dietary laws. Id.; see generally
What is Halal?, IFANCA, https://perma.cc/CZW9-LTSF.
288. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1306.
289. Id.
290. Id.at 1306-09.
291. Id.at 1316-18.
292. Id. at 1314-15.
293. Id.at 1315. While the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants in almost all of Abdulhaseeb's claims, it vacated the grant of summary judgement in claims five and ten against the Department of Corrections defendants in
their professional capacities and remanded the case. Id.at 1323.
294. Id.at 1320.
295. Id.at 1317-18.
296. Id.at 1317.
297. Id.at 1318.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol42/iss1/2

38

Geier and Blankenship-Knox: When Speech Is Your Stock in Trade: What Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch

2020]

WHEN SPEECH IS YOUR STOCK IN TRADE

choose between following his sincerely held religious beliefs and staying
alive. '298 "RLUIPA prohibits the government from creating a substantial
299
burden on a prisoner's sincerely held religious beliefs":
[A] religious exercise is substantially burdened under 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc- 1(a) when a government (1) requires participating in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or
(3) places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to engage in
conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage in
conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief, such as where
the government presents the plaintiff with a Hobson's choice-an illusory choice where the only realistically possible course of action
trenches on an adherent's sincerely held religious beliefs.3 °°
The majority held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the denial of a
halal diet substantially burdened Abdulhaseeb.3 ° '
Judge Gorsuch supported the holding of the majority, yet additionally
composed a concurrence. Judge Gorsuch argued that the facts of the case
should have been interpreted to favor Abdulhaseeb, giving him the benefit
of the doubt.302 Abdulhaseeb required a halal-certified diet and ODOC provided no means for him to procure it for himself. 30 3 Therefore, he was
forced to choose between violating his religious tenets or starving to
death.30 4 Judge Gorsuch indicated that the court should have applied the
Sherbert-Thomas prohibition, 3 0 5 stating, "[t]o say that access to edible food
298. Id.at 1324 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
299. Id.
300. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
301. Id.at 1320 (majority opinion).
302. Id.at 1324 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("As both the summary judgment non-movant
and a pro se litigant, Mr. Abdulhaseeb deserves the benefit of the doubt.").
303. Id. at 1324-25.
304. Id.at 1325.
305. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). The Sherbert-Thomas test is a type of test adopted by courts when determining
whether to grant or deny unemployment compensation. The government needs to show a
compelling government interest when unemployment compensation is denied to a person
who was fired from a job as the job did not agree with the person's religion. The test is used
to broaden the protection granted through the Free Exercise Clause. The test consists of four
criteria to determine if an individual's right to religious free exercise has been violated:
[I] [w]hether the person has a claim involving a sincere religious belief, [2]
[w]hether the government action places a substantial burden on the person's
ability to act on that belief[,] [3] [whether the government action is] in furtherance of a "compelling state interest," and [4] [whether the government]
has pursued that interest in the manner least restrictive, or least burdensome,
to religion.
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qualifies as an important benefit is to put it mildly, and Mr. Abdulhaseeb's
30 6
Claim 10 thus falls squarely within the Sherbert-Thomas prohibition.,
Finally, Judge Gorsuch addressed the claim that questionable foods
had sporadically been placed onto Mr. Abdulhaseeb's cafeteria tray, rendering his entire meal inedible. 30 7 He contended that this occasional impediment was not a constructive prohibition of Abdulhaseeb's religious exercise.3 °8 While many questions remained at the conclusion of this opinion,
it remains apparent that Justice Gorsuch views obstructions to religious liberties as strongly violative of the First Amendment.
C. Justice Brett Kavanaugh
The record of Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh's judicial philosophy on public-school prayer cases addresses more specifically the notion of religious activities in public schools compared to Justice Gorsuch's.
Justice Kavanaugh, like Justice Scalia, contends that government invocation
or endorsement of belief in a monotheistic God does not violate the Establishment Clause, and that the Founders did not proscribe prayer in public
venues such as public schools. 30 9 Relying on the nation's historical traditions as reason to allow prayer in public schools, 310 Justice Kavanaugh's
conservative philosophy of accepting religiosity in public schools also seeks
3' 1
to protect private speech when individuals pray aloud in public schools.
The cases that then-Judge Kavanaugh ruled on while sitting on the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals position him to rule in favor of individual
religious expression in public schools and overturn cases that have

What Does "Free Exercise" of Religion Mean Under the FirstAmendment?, FREEDOM F.
https://perma.cc/46BT-VTKF. In both cases, the Supreme Court found First Amend-

INST.,

ment violations when the government denied unemployment benefits to religious adherents
because they followed their beliefs.
306. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted).

307. ld
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Judge Kavanaugh Would Vote to ExpandReligious Exemptions From GeneralLaws, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/ABS2-YHY3; Ariane de Vogue, Justice Brett Kavanaugh Signals Court Should Take Up Religious Liberty
Case in the Future, CNN (Mar. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/2WXW-KNA9.
310. See KATHERINE STEWART, THE GOOD NEWS CLUB: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT'S STEALTH
ASSAULT ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN 85, 87 (2012) (stating that Justices Scalia and Thomas
purported that the founders of the Nation never intended to separate church and state).
311. See JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT
95-97, 127 (2007) (highlighting that Justice Scalia contended that the Establishment Clause
was never meant and has never been read by the Court to serve as an impediment to purely
private religious speech).
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identified Establishment Clause violations. 12 The holdings in Priestsfor
Life v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,"' Nedow v. Roberts,314 and the amicus brief for Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe31 5 demonstrate Justice Kavanaugh's views of religious expression in
public schools.
1. Priests for Life v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
In Priestsfor Life, a nonprofit organization challenged an accommodation created by the Obama Administration for religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations under the Affordable Care Act ("ACA").3 16 The accommodation allowed nonprofit organizations to simply fill out a form to
opt out of the ACA benefit that required most health insurance plans to
cover contraception.31 7 The government then worked with the insurance
company to ensure that the nonprofits' employees would still have no-cost
coverage without the nonprofits providing insurance coverage for birth
control directly. 31 8 The nonprofit organization Priests for Life, among others, contended that merely filling out the form to obtain the accommodation
violated their religious beliefs. 31 9 The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the government's accommodation struck a fair balance of protecting32both
women's access to health care
0
and the religious beliefs of employers.
In a subsequent petition for rehearing en banc, then-Judge Kavanaugh
wrote a dissent, contending that a nonprofit organization should be permitted to use religious beliefs to obstruct women's access to birth control.32'
Judge Kavanaugh noted that many religious organizations around the country complained that submitting the required form contravened their religious
beliefs because in doing so, they were complicit in providing coverage for
312. See Liz Hayes, The CaseAgainst Kavanaugh, 71 AM. UNITED: CHURCH & ST. MAG.,
6, 7 (Sept. 2018), https://perma.cc/5NX9-8AF9 (stating that Judge Kavanaugh's record "sug-

gests he would be open to overturning" Supreme Court precedent regarding school-sponsored prayers in public schools).

313. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir.
2014), vacated and remandedby Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
314. Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
315. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
316. PriestsforLife, 772 F.3d at 239-40.
317. Id. at 239.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 267.
321. Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 808 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (denying petition for rehearing en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2020

41

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:31

contraceptives.3 22 These organizations would have been subject to a monetary penalty for failing to submit the form, and that constituted a substantial
burden on their exercise of religion.3 23 The nonprofits here also claimed
that the government had less restrictive ways of ensuring that the employees
organizations had access to contraception without requiring
of the religious
324
complicity.

In his dissent, Judge Kavanaugh relied on three primary arguments.
First, requiring submission of the form substantially burdened any religious
organization's exercise of religion because "the regulations require[d] the
organization[] to take an action contrary to [its] sincere religious beliefs" or
pay a "significant" penalty.325 Second, the Hobby Lobby case strongly suggested "that the Government ha[d] a compelling interest in facilitating ac326
cess to contraception for the employees of these religious organizations.'"
Lastly, requiring religious organizations to submit the form was "not the
Government's least restrictive means of furthering its interest in facilitating
,321
This case
access to contraception for the organizations' employees.
of allowphilosophy
helps to demonstrate Justice Kavanaugh's overarching
ing nonprofit organizations the right to use religious beliefs to obstruct
women's access to birth control. Taken to the next level, it can be surmised
that Justice Kavanaugh would favor more religious freedoms in public areas
such as schools.
2. Newdow v. Roberts
In2010, then-Judge Kavanaugh sat on the District of Columbia Circuit
when it ruled on Newdow v. Roberts.32 8 While not specifically a case on
public-school prayer, it does provide some insight into Justice Kavanaugh's
position on religious demonstrations by public officials in situations, 3as
29
when an audience is comprised of both students and the general public.

In Newdow, a group of self-proclaimed atheists filed suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief to have the phrase "So help me God" and any other prayer

322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.at 15.
Id.
See id
Id.(referring to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)).

326. Id.
327. Id.at 15-16.
328. Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concur-

ring in the judgment).
329. Seeid. at 1016.
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elements barred from President Obama's 2009 presidential inauguration.3 3 °
Some individuals and organizations believed the separation of church and
state was violated when the President took the oath of office and utters the
phrase "So help me God., 3 3 1 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims
were moot and that they lacked standing. 332 While the court ruled on procedural grounds, Judge Kavanaugh noted that "those longstanding practices
do not violate the333Establishment Clause as it has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court."
Judge Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion focusing specifically on
the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. 334 He noted that Americans of all faith
backgrounds, including atheists, have equal status and legal rights in the
United States.33 5 Therefore, religious language, even that which addresses
the beliefs of many faiths and which has historically been used, may cause
real "anguish and outrage" to some Americans.33 6 Despite that, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that "we likewise cannot dismiss the desire of others in
America to publicly ask for God's blessing on certain government activities
337
and to publicly seek God's guidance for certain government officials.
Judge Kavanaugh then turned to a viewpoint-neutrality analysis. The
plaintiffs suggested that the removal of the religious components of the inaugural ceremony would have cleansed the ceremony of religious expression and would have reflected "true government 'neutrality' toward religion. '33 The defendants argued that stripping government ceremonies of
any reference to God or religious expression would have reflected "unwarranted hostility to religion and would, in effect, 'establish' atheism., 339 To
the defendants, the plaintiffs' suit was "[a] relentless and all-pervasive
330. Id. at 1006-07 (majority opinion). Plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction to
bar such religious references at any future inaugurations. See id
331. See, e.g., Rob Boston, Swear to God - Or Not, It's Up to You, AM. UNITED: WALL
SEPARATION BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/3MA3-HFSA.
332. Newdow, 603 F.3d at 1008-13.
333. Id. at 1013 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
334. Id. at 1016-22. Kavanaugh dedicated the first section of his concurring opinion to
explaining why the plaintiffs' claims were not moot and why they did, indeed, having standing. Id. at 1013-16. The remaining portion of the concurring opinion focuses on why such
religious speech at inaugurations is not a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 101622.
335. Id. at 1016.
336. Id.
337. Id. Stripping such religious language from government ceremonies might be construed as hostile towards religion, resulting in an Establishment Clause violation of a different sort: "establish[ing] atheism". Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
338. Id.
339. Id.; cf Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
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life [which] could
public
attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of 34
0
Constitution.,
the
with
inconsistent
itself become
Next, Judge Kavanaugh referenced the historical tradition of legislative prayer. He argued that, based on the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence, the Establishment Clause does not allow for a "one-size-fits-all
test., 34 1 Justice Kavanaugh relied on Marsh v. Chambers, in which the
Court upheld a state legislature's practice of beginning each session with a
prayer by a state-employed chaplain.34 2 The Marsh Court held that opening
a legislative session with prayer was "'deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country. '343 "Since the Founding, the 'practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom."' 344 The practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer
has become "'part of the fabric of our society' such that invoking God was
"'not, in these circumstances, an "establishment" of religion... [but]
simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.' 345 Justice Kavanaugh concluded that "the words 'so
help me God' in the Presidential oath [were] not proselytizing or otherwise
exploitative" like the legislative prayer in Marsh.3 46
A presidential oath requires a performative utterance that is required
by the Constitution, and therefore, has a legal function. Using the Marsh
rule, as interpreted by Judge Kavanaugh, religious utterances by the government are constitutional so long as they are rooted in history and tradition
and do not proselytize. Government expressions of religion would be constitutionally permissible if they endorsed particular religious ideas, unless
they aggressively advocated a specific religious creed.
3. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (Amicus Brie)
3 47

The amicus brief in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
co-authored by now-Justice Kavanaugh, provides further indication of his
judicial philosophy regarding prayer in public schools. Despite the fact that
Justice Kavanaugh co-wrote an amicus brief on behalf of others as a private
340. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
341. Newdow, 603 F.3dat 1017.
342. Id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-86 (1983)).
343. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786).
344. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786).
345. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
346. Id.at 1018.
347. Brief of Amici Curiae Congressman Steven Largent and Congressman J.C. Watts in
Support of Petitioner, Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (No. 99-62)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
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attorney, based on other compositions, arguably many tenets in the brief
would be embraced and facilitated by Judge Kavanaugh.3 48 The school district in Santa Fe, Texas chose to permit students to deliver a brief invocation
and/or message during the pre-game ceremonies at home varsity football
games.3 49 Under the guidance of the school's principal, the Santa Fe High
School Student Council conducted a secret ballot election of the student
body to determine whether a statement or invocation was to be a part of the
pre-game ceremonies; if so, the student body elected a "[s]tudent [c]haplain" to deliver the statement or invocation. 350 The student volunteer who
was selected by his or her classmates decided what message and/or invocation to deliver.3 5'
The school district argued that the student invocations were private
speech that should not be chilled by the Establishment Clause.35 2 The Su
preme Court concluded that the district's attempt to disentangle itself from
the religious messages by creating an official process for selecting the student chaplain did not make the invocations constitutional.35 3 The Court determined that "[t]he delivery of such a message--over the school's public
address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly
and implicitly encourages public prayer-[was] not properly characterized
as 'private' speech., 354 The amicus argued that not only were the schoolsponsored prayers constitutional, but that "[t]he Establishment Clause permit[ed] a student speaker to deliver a religious message in a neutrally available school forum, so long as the school itself d[id] not select, compose,
355 He noted that in several cases 3 5 6
deliver, or require a religious message.,
the Court stressed a "critical distinction 'between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect.' 357 The amici brief made the assertion that the plaintiffs'
(two students and their mothers) theory of the Constitution was inverted: "If
348. See Frank Ravitch, Judge Kavanaugh on Law & Religion Issues, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 30, 2018) https://perma.cc/R9B4-H5M9; see also Tebbe, supra note 309.
349. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297-98 (2000).
350. Id.at 297-98, 309.
351. Id.at 321 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The elected student, not the government,
would choose what to say.").
352. Id.at 302 (majority opinion).
353. Id.at 305-06.
354. Id. at310.
355. Brief of Amici Curiae, supranote 347, at 8-9.
356. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995).
357. BriefofAmici Curiae, supra note 347, at 9 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841).
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Santa Fe High School took steps toprevent the student speaker from invoking God's name or uttering religious words or saying a prayer in his or her
pre-game statement, then the school would violate the Constitution... .,358
Justice Kavanaugh has repeatedly written on issues that impact religious freedom, and most often sided with those who seek religious liberties
in the public spectrum. 359 "[Justice] Kavanaugh's [views on the Establishment Clause] would allow government expression that is unambiguously
sectarian. ' ' 6
CONCLUSION

Balancing when and how religion and faith may be expressed in public
schools by both students and employees has proved challenging for the
United States Supreme Court. 36 1 For example, Engel v. Vitale362 caused a

tremendous upheaval 363 when the Supreme "Court [first] held that the First
Amendment's [Establishment Clause] barred public school educators from
leading their pupils in religious exercises.' 364 The Supreme Court's decisions barring religious exercises in public schools proved unpopular "because they contravened longstanding, cherished practices that occurred
throughout much of the nation on a daily basis." 365 "[M]any commentators
have contended that these decisions demonstrate the Supreme Court's hostility toward religion .... 3 6 6 These critics generalize the holding in Engel
as eliminating prayer in public schools.3 67 However, freedom of expression
for students was not chilled in Engel; instead, state sponsorship of public
prayer was debarred, ensuring viewpoint neutrality which complies with the
intent of the Establishment Clause.3 68

358. Id. at 3.
359. See Ravitch, supra note 348.
360. Tebbe, supra note 309; see also Ravitch, supra note 348 (concluding that "more
likely to lean toward the mold of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who rarely agreed that
government action violated the establishment clause").
361. See JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOL HOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 362 (2018).
362. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962).
363. See Corinna Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way: Reconstructing
Engel, 67 STAN. L. REV. 479, 507 (2015).
364. DRIVER, supra note 361, at 362.

365. Id.
366. Id. at 363.
367. See, e.g., Charles C. Haynes, 50 Years Later, How School-PrayerRuling Changed
America, FREEDOM F. INST. (2012).

368. See

DRIVER,

supra note 361, at 363-76.
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The Kennedy v. Bremerton case is a prime example of the longstanding
separation of church and state philosophy that could be overturned with the
appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh-both as it applies to
public school football games as a forum for individual prayer and the attempt to insulate private religious speech in public fora. 369 The Court has
been consistent since the 1962 Engel ruling-that public schools are not
temples of indoctrination, and that "religious education is the province of
parents and religious communities, not government bureaucrats. '370 If
courts are concerned about the student-on-student peer pressure to conform
to the same religious beliefs, then that concern is intensified if the pressure
comes from adults. An adult employee who engages in religious rituals in
the presence of students is sure to impart some coercion on the students to
participate in the activity. If the employee is revered by the students, such
as the case with a well-liked teacher or a respected coach, then there is the
potential for even stronger influence. The protection of students against
religious coercion in public school settings has been protected multiple
times in court 7I and the separation of church and state philosophy has been
respected by various secular and non-secular organizations.3 72
The "period of d~tente" 373 that has permeated religion and public
schools since 1962 is in jeopardy with addition of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court bench. There is now a real chance that we
could see cases like Kennedy v. Bremerton come out in favor of the public
369. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 635 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring).
370. Heather L. Weaver, Can the Wall Between Church and State Survive Brett Kavanaugh?, ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (Sept. 7, 2018) https://perma.cc/5ME4-WC7W.
371. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 599 (1992) (holding that clergy of-

fering invocation at middle and high school graduations is unconstitutional); Doe v. Duncanville Ind. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 161, 168 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming an injunction
prohibiting district employees from leading, encouraging, promoting, or participating in
prayer with students during extracurricular or curricular activities before, during or after
school related sporting events); Jager v. Douglas Cry. Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826 (11 th

Cir. 1989) (holding that beginning games with an invocation is unconstitutional).
372. See, e.g., Tina Kelly, Coach in New Jersey CannotPray with Players, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2008), https://perma.cc/VL79-GL9N. A federal appeals court ruled that a school

district did not violate the constitutional rights of a football coach when it prohibited staff
members from participating in students' prayers. Jeffery S. Solochek & Matt Baker, Faith
and Footballa ControversialPairing,TAMPA BAY TIMES, Sept. 28, 2013, at C1. A Pasco

County Superintendent sent a memo to all employees noting that it is unconstitutional for
them to be praying with students before a school sponsored activity. SEE YOU AT THE POLE,
https://perma.cc/Y5RA-2LLP. "See You at the Pole" is a student-led and student organized
global movement of prayer where students meet at the school's flagpole during non-instructional time to participate in a prayer activity. The organization notes on its website that
adults must not lead the event irrespective of whether the adult is an employee or not.
373. See DRIVER, supra note 361, at 362.
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employee, which would splinter the current philosophy of viewpoint neutrality and reduce the protection of the Establishment Clause. This change
would allow for the potential coercion of religion upon students of public
schools.
The essence of the argument in the Kennedy case is still relevant because "important unresolved factual questions would make it very difficult
"3174
if not impossible at this stage to decide the free speech question....
There, Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh all concurred that
Coach Kennedy had two questions: (1) Was he "likely to prevail on his
claim that the termination of his employment violated his free speech
rights," and (2) in order to answer question 1, what he "was likely to be able
to prove regarding the basis for the school's action. ' '375 After Coach Kennedy engaged in prayer "on the field, under the game lights, in BHS-logoed
attire, in front of an audience," the superintendent reprimanded Kennedy for
neglecting his responsibilities "'including the supervision of players"' and
that such conduct would lead "'any reasonable observer' to think that the
district was endorsing religion. 376 The district court made the conclusion
that Coach Kennedy was still in charge and was "'responsible for the conduct of his students"' on the team. 377 "A reasonable observer," in the district
as a coach, participating [and]
court's opinion, "would have seen [Kennedy]
378
faith.,
of
session
orchestrated
an
leading
This conclusion led to a review by the Ninth Circuit. Justices Alito,
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh characterized the Ninth Circuit as more
imprecise on the question of fact than the District Court. 3 7 9 "[T]he Ninth
Circuit recounted all of [Coach Kennedy's] prayer-related activities over
the course of several years, including conduct in which he engaged as a
private citizen, such as praying in the stands as a fan after he was suspended
from his duties., 380 "If this case [was an] appeal within [the Supreme
Court's] mandatory jurisdiction," then there would be a "clear obligation.., to vacate the [lower court's] decision" and remand it back to the
District Court. 381 The question before the Court, however, was "whether
[the Court] should grant discretionary review, and [they] generally do not

374. Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 635.

375. Id.
376. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Oct. 23, 2015, letter from Superintendent Aaron Leavell to Coach Kennedy).
377. Id. at 821 (quoting Sep. 19, 2016, order denying injunction).
378. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
379. Kennedy, 139 S.Ct. at 636.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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grant such review to decide highly fact-specific questions. 3 82 Therefore,
the denial of the writ was done due to the facts in question, not based upon
the merits of "whether [Coach Kennedy] .. . was likely to prevail on his
claim that the termination of his employment violated his free speech
rights."3 83
An opportunity is sagaciously delineated in the denial to return to the
Supreme Court with a case on public school employees' free speech rights
when dealing with religion.3 84 Alito found fault with the Ninth Circuit's
analysis that "public school teachers and coaches may be fired if they engage in any expression that the school does not like while they are on
duty .... "385 He amplified his concern for this position by commenting on
the Ninth Circuit's application of Garcetti v. Ceballos.386 Interpreting the
Kennedy case through the lens of Garcetti,the Ninth Circuit "appear[ed] to
regard teachers and coaches as being on duty at all times from the moment
they report to work until to the moment they depart." 387 Therefore, "if [public school employees] are visible to a student while eating lunch, they can
be ordered not to engage in any 'demonstrative' conduct of a religious nature, such as folding their hands or bowing their heads in prayer."38' 8 The
"school could also regulate what [those employees] do during a period when
they are not teaching by preventing them from reading things that might be
spotted by students. 38 9 Justice Alito concluded his concurrence with concern for the use of Garcetti in this manner noting that "a public employer
cannot convert private speech into public speech 'by creating excessively
broad job descriptions.' 390 The final worthy note from the Justices is their
objection to the Ninth Circuit's position that "a coach's duty to serve as a
good role model requires the coach to refrain from any manifestation of
religious faith--even when the coach is plainly not on duty.",39' To these
Justices, "[t]he suggestion that even while off duty, a teacher or coach can392
not engage in any outward manifestation of religious faith is remarkable."
382. Id.
383. Id. at 635.
384. Id. at 636 ("[T]he Circuit's understanding of the free speech rights of public-school
teachers is troubling and may justify review in the future.").
385. Id.
386. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (holding that expression pursuant to
official job responsibilities is not protected).
387. Kennedy, 139 S. Ct. at 636.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424).
391. Id. at 637.
392. Id.
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In sum, it seems apparent that at the very least, this cadre of Justices believes
this type of scenario is ripe and they have the appetite to review a case of
this nature.
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